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Abstract: The Minamata Convention, adopted in October 2013 and aimed in 
part at controlling the long-range transport of mercury into the Arctic, is review-
ed from two perspectives. First, ten promising aspects of the Convention are high-
lighted. Promises include, among others: committing Parties to phase-out mercury 
mining; establishing a phase-out date of 2020 for many mercury-added products; 
encouraging the phase-down of mercury uses and releases in dentistry; prohibiting 
and restricting the use of mercury in listed manufacturing processes; and requiring 
Parties to control atmospheric emissions from listed point sources, such as coal-
fired power plants and waste incineration facilities. Second, seven implementation 
challenges are discussed. Among the challenges are: reaching rigorous ratification 
of the Convention; ensuring timely phase-outs; achieving actual reductions in 
mercury emissions and releases; ensuring adequate financing; and sorting out 
relationships with other conventions and international mercury-related initiatives.
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I. Introduction
The Minamata Convention on Mercury1 was adopted on 10 October 2013 at 
a diplomatic conference in Kumamoto, Japan. The conclusion of the Convention 
followed upon five negotiating sessions, 2010-2013, by the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee.2 The Convention draws its name from the city of Minama-
ta where methylmercury discharged from a chemical factory caused a serious 
neurological disorder to local inhabitants consuming contaminated seafood. The 
problem was officially recognized in 1956 and scientists subsequently named the 
ailment as Minamata Disease.3
The Convention is a global agreement spurred by the multiple sources of mer-
cury pollution and long-range mercury transports around the world. Humans can 
neither create nor destroy mercury, though anthropogenic activities can release it 
from the earth’s crust and release it into the environment.4 Total anthropogenic emi-
ssions of mercury to the atmosphere in 2010 are estimated to be 1960 tonnes5 with 
Asia considered to be the main source region. East and Southeast Asia are thought 
to contribute about 40 per cent of the global total and South Asia a further 8 per 
cent.6
Numerous sectoral sources of mercury air emissions exist. The four largest 
contributors are: artisanal and small-scale gold mining (about 727 tonnes per 
year, 37 per cent of global total); coal burning (474 tonnes, 24 per cent); primary 
production of non-ferrous metals (193 tonnes, 10 per cent); and cement production 
1       Minamata Convention on Mercury, 10 October 2013, at http://www.mercuryconvention.org/
Convention/tabid/ 3426/Default.aspx, 15 March 2015. 
2        IISD Reporting Services, Summary of the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Minamata Convention on Mercury and Its Preparatory Meeting: 7-11 October 2013, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 27, 2013, p. 3.
3       Japan, Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Mana-
gement in Japan, Tokyo: Environmental Health and Safety Division, Environmental Health 
Department, September 2013, at http://www.env.go.jp/chemi/tmms/pr-m/mat01/en_full.pdf, 
15 March 2015.
4       Lee Bell, Joe DiGangi and Jack Weinberg, An NGO Introduction to Mercury Pollution and 
the Minamata Convention on Mercury, Chicago: IPEN, 2014, p. 11. 
5        United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Mercury Assessment 2013: 
Sources, Emissions, Releases and Environmental Transport, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP 
Chemicals Branch, 2013, p. 9.
6        UNEP, Global Mercury Assessment 2013: Sources, Emissions, Releases and Environmental 
Transport, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP Chemicals Branch, 2013, p. 11.
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(177 tonnes, 9 per cent).7 Other human sources include, among others, large-scale 
gold production, oil refining, contaminated sites, the chlor-alkali industry, consumer 
product waste and cremation (dental amalgam).8 
Total anthropogenic releases of mercury to water in 2010 is estimated at 1000 
tonnes at a minimum. The three largest sources are: artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining (about 800 tonnes); deforestation (260 tonnes); and industrial sites (185 
tonnes).9
Negotiation of the Minamata Convention was substantially driven by Arctic 
environmental and health concerns. About 100 tonnes of mercury are estimated to 
enter the Arctic Ocean from the air each year, while nearly another 100 tonnes is 
thought to inflow from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, rivers and coastal erosion.10 
Levels of mercury in upper trophic level marine animals, such as the beluga, ringed 
seal, polar bear and birds of prey, have shown an overall ten-fold increase over the 
past roughly 150 years.11 Some top marine predators, such as toothed whales and 
polar bears, have exhibited mercury levels in their tissues and organs believed to 
exceed thresholds for biological effects.12 Mercury levels in the endangered ivory 
gull, a scavenger of marine mammal carcasses, have increased by over 40 times in 
the period 1877 to 2007 and a precipitous population decline may be linked in part 
to decreasing reproductive success because of mercury exposure.13 A crash in the 
Arctic fox population on Mednyi Island, located off the Russian Federation, has 
been posited as connected to the elevated mercury levels in foxes which depend 
on coastal marine life as a sole food source.14 Considerable uncertainty surrounds 
7      UNEP, Global Mercury Assessment 2013: Sources, Emissions, Releases and Environmental 
Transport, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP Chemicals Branch, 2013, p. 9. 
8      UNEP, Global Mercury Assessment 2013: Sources, Emissions, Releases and Environmental 
Transport, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP Chemicals Branch, 2013, p. 10. 
9      UNEP, Global Mercury Assessment 2013: Sources, Emissions, Releases and Environmental 
Transport, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP Chemicals Branch, 2013, p. iii.  
10    Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Pollution 2011, Oslo, 
Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. iv. 
11      AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. xii.
12     AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. xiii; 
Igor Lehnherr, Methylmercury Biochemistry: A Review with Special Reference to Arctic 
Aquatic Ecosystems, Environmental Reviews, Vol. 22, 2014, pp. 229, 237. 
13    Alexander L. Bond, Keith A. Hobson and Brian A. Branfireun, Rapidly Increasing Methyl 
Mercury in Endangered Ivory Gull (Pagophila Eburnea) Feathers over a 130 Year Record, 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B, Vol. 282, No. 20150032, 2015, pp. 1~8.
14    Natalia Bocharova et al., Correlates between Feeding Ecology and Mercury Levels in 
Historical and Modern Arctic Foxes (Vulpes lagopus), PLoS ONE, Vol. 8, Issue 5, 2013, pp. 
1~11.
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the risk of high mercury levels when combined with other stressors, particularly 
persistent organic pollutants and climate change.15
An additional emerging concern is the possibility for substantial increases in 
mercury levels in the Arctic due to climate change. Melting sea ice, glaciers and 
thawing permafrost may release sequestered mercury into the aquatic environ-
ment.16  
Human health concerns, such as effects in brain development and on repro-
ductive, immune and cardiovascular systems, are especially prevalent for coastal 
communities relying on marine-based diets.17 For example, blood mercury con-
centrations in over 90 per cent of women of child-bearing age in some areas of 
Greenland have been found to exceed guidelines for safe levels of mercury, and at 
Nunavut, Canada study found that 59 per cent of children surveyed had a methy-
lmercury intake that exceeded guideline safe levels.18
The Minamata Convention’s preamble itself emphasizes the special need to 
address mercury levels in the Arctic. The text specifically notes “the particular 
vulnerabilities of Arctic ecosystems and indigenous communities because of bio-
magnification of mercury and contamination of traditional foods...”19
Various political factors played a role in the move from voluntary approaches 
to addressing mercury to a legally-binding agreement.20 Those factors included: the 
knowledge-based leadership of the UNEP Secretariat; the power-based leadership 
of the United States with the Obama administration strongly supporting a legal 
agreement on mercury; and interest-based realities with many developing countries 
perceiving new opportunities for funding and technology transfers.21 The Arctic 
Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) also built the 
15     AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. 1. 
16    See J.F. Provencher et al., Mercury and Marine Birds in Arctic Canada: Effects, Current 
Trends, and Why We Should Be Paying Closer Attention, Environmental Reviews, Vol. 22, 
2014, pp. 244, 247.
17     AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. xiii.
18     AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. 30.
19      Minamata Convention, Preamble. 
20    Steinar Andreson, Kristin Rosendal and Jon Birger Skjaerseth, Why Negotiate a Legally 
Binding Mercury Convention?, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2013, p. 425.
21    Steinar Andreson, Kristin Rosendal and Jon Birger Skjaerseth, Why Negotiate a Legally 
Binding Mercury Convention?, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2013, pp. 434~437. 
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case over time for a legally-binding agreement.22
The extent to which the new Mercury Convention will curb the transport of 
mercury into the Arctic remains to be seen with two images largely capturing the 
governance realities. Mercurial promises is one apt descriptor as the Convention 
offers many “rays of hope”, such as requiring a phase-out of mercury mining 
and many mercury containing products. Mercurial challenges is a second reality 
with various implementation challenges looming on the horizon, such as reaching 
rigorous ratification of the Convention; achieving actual reductions in mercury air 
emissions and land/water releases; and ensuring adequate financing for capacity-
building and technology transfers. A review of key promises and major challenges 
follows.
II. Mercurial Promises
The Minamata Convention, having as an overall objective in Article 1 the 
protection of human health and the environment from anthropogenic emissions 
and releases of mercury, offers many promising “beams” for controlling mercury 
pollution.23 Ten progressions are summarized here.
A. Phasing-out Primary Mercury Mining
Article 3 of the Convention requires the phase-out of mercury mining. No new 
mercury mines are allowed for a Party after entry into force of the Convention for 
it. Mining conducted within a Party’s territory at the date of entry into force of the 
Convention must be phased out within 15 years.
The promising direction is obviously dimmed somewhat by the date of ente-
ring into force provision. The phase-out date is not linked to the overall entry into 
force date of the Convention but is dependent on an individual State’s formal adop-
tion of the Convention. This leaves room for a State to drag its feet in ratifying the 
22    AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2002: Heavy Metals in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2005; 
AMAP, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic, Oslo, Norway: AMAP, 2011, p. 
xii; AMAP/UNEP, Technical Background Report for the Global Mercury Assessment 2013, 
Oslo, Norway and Geneva, Switzerland: AMAP and UNEP Chemicals Branch, 2013. 
23      For a further recent review, see Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen and Franz Xaver Perrez, The Mi-
namata Convention: A Comprehensive Response to a Global Problem, Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, p. 195.
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Convention in order to prolong the primary mining timeline. China in particular 
had pushed hard in negotiations to allow mercury mining to continue for a limited 
period in order to provide raw materials for the production of vinyl chloride 
monomer and other products.24
B. Limiting Trade of Mercury
The Convention prohibits exports of mercury except when an importing Party 
or non-Party has given its written consent.25 Export to a Party may only occur if for 
a use allowed to the importing Party under the Convention or for environmentally 
sound interim storage.26 Export to a non-Party would have the same restrictions 
with an additional requirement that the non-Party must certify it has measures in 
place to ensure the protection of human health and the environment.27
The Convention restricts mercury imports from non-Parties.28 Parties are not to 
allow such imports unless the non-Party has provided certification that the mercury 
is not from a prohibited source. Those sources are from primary mercury mining 
that is no longer allowed in a country or mercury waste from decommissioned 
chlor-alkali facilities. A limited exception to the certification requirement is 
provided in Article 3.9 and the exception was specifically insisted upon by the 
United States.29 The exception allows a Party to waive the certification requirement 
provided that it maintains comprehensive restrictions on the export of mercury and 
has domestic measures in place to ensure that imported mercury is managed in an 
environmentally sound manner.
C. Phasing-out the Manufacture, Import or Export of 
    Mercury-added Products
24    Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen and Franz Xaver Perrez, The Minamata Convention: A Compre-
hensive Response to a Global Problem, Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, p. 199.
25      Minamata Convention, Article 3.6.
26     Henrik Selin, Global Environmental Law and Treaty-Making on Hazardous Substances: The 
Minamata Convention and Mercury Abatement, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 14, 
Issue 1, 2014, pp. 1, 9. 
27     Minamata Convention, Article 3(6)(b).
28     Minamata Convention, Article 3.8.
29    Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen and Franz Xaver Perrez, The Minamata Convention: A Compre-
hensive Response to a Global Problem, Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 204~205.
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The Convention establishes a phase-out date of 2020 for mercury-added pro-
ducts listed in Part 1 of Annex A.30 Those products include: batteries except for 
certain button cell batteries with a mercury content less than 2 per cent; switches 
and relays; some fluorescent lamps; high-pressure mercury vapour lamps; cosme-
tics and soaps; pesticides, biocides and topical antiseptics; and non-electric mea-
suring devices including barometers, thermometers and sphygmomanometers.
Annex A of the Convention excludes selected products from the phase-
out date. They include: products essential for civil protection and military uses; 
products used in traditional or religious practices; and vaccines containing thio-
mersal as preservatives. The latter exclusion was supported by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as thiomersal is added to vaccines as a preservative to remove 
the need for refrigeration, thereby facilitating the access to vaccines in remote 
areas.31  
D. Phasing-down the Use of Dental Amalgam
Pursuant to Article 4.3 of the Convention, each Party is required to take 
two or more measures from a list of nine measures to phase-down the use of 
mercury in dental amalgam.32 Those measures include, among others: setting 
national objectives for cavity prevention and health promotion thereby minimizing 
the need for dental fillings; promoting the use of mercury-free alternatives to 
dental restoration; promoting research and development of mercury-free fillings; 
restricting the use of dental amalgam; and promoting the use of best environmental 
practices in dental facilities to reduce mercury releases.
E. Prohibiting and Restricting the Use of Mercury in 
    Listed Manufacturing Processes
The Convention prohibits the use of mercury or mercury compounds in manu-
facturing processes listed in Annex B, Part I after the phase-out date specified in the 
30     Minamata Convention, Article 4.
31     Henrik Selin, Global Environmental Law and Treaty-Making on Hazardous Substances: The 
Minamata Convention and Mercury Abatement, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 14, 
Issue 1, 2014, p. 10.
32     The measures are set out in Annex A, Part II of the Convention.
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Annex.33 Use of mercury in chlor-alkali production must cease by 2025, while use 
of mercury as a catalyst in acetaldehyde production must end by 2018.
The Convention requires Parties to restrict uses of mercury in manufacturing 
processes listed in Annex B, Part II in accordance with the measures set out in the 
Annex.34 Reduction measures are established for three mercury using processes, 
namely: vinyl chloride monomer production; production of sodium or potassium 
methylate or ethylate; and polyurethane production. Examples of vinyl chloride 
monomer measures include: reducing the use of mercury in terms of per unit of 
production by 50% by the year 2020 against 2010 use; taking measures to reduce 
emissions and releases of mercury to the environment; and not allowing the use 
of mercury five years after the Conference of the Parties has established that 
mercury-free processes have become technically and economically feasible. A fixed 
phase-out date for the use of mercury in vinyl chloride monomer production was 
not included due to the opposition of China which still relies on that production 
method.35
F. Calling for National Action Plans to Reduce/Eliminate Mercury Uses
    and Releases from Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining
Pursuant to Article 7 of the Convention, each Party that determines the level 
of artisanal and small-scale gold mining and processing in its territory is more 
than insignificant must develop and implement a national action plan. Annex C 
of the Convention sets out the required elements of national action plans, such as: 
national objectives and reduction targets; eliminating open burning of amalgam; 
strategies for promoting the reduction of emissions and releases of mercury; a 
public health strategy on the exposure of artisanal and small-scale gold miners and 
their communities; and strategies to prevent the exposure of vulnerable populations, 
particularly children and women of child-bearing age. 
The Convention leaves considerable flexibility as to when a national action 
plan must be submitted to the Secretariat. Each Party is required to submit its 
national action plan no later than three years after entry into force of the Con-
33     Minamata Convention, Article 5.2.
34     Minamata Convention, Article 5.3.
35    Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen and Franz Xaver Perrez, The Minamata Convention: A Compre-
hensive Response to a Global Problem, Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, p. 205.
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vention for it or three years after the Party notifies the Secretariat of the more than 
insignificant mining and processing activities in its territory, whichever is later.36 
The Convention does not define insignificant. 
Even without a national action plan, Parties are required to take reduction 
steps. Each Party, having within its territory artisanal and small-scale gold mining 
and processing in which mercury amalgam is used to extract gold from ore, 
must take steps to reduce and where feasible to eliminate the use of mercury and 
emissions and releases into the environment of mercury from such mining and 
processing.37
G. Requiring Parties to Control Atmospheric Emissions from 
     Listed Point Sources
The Convention lists five point source categories from which air emission 
control measures must be taken.38 The five categories are: coal-fired power plants; 
coal-fired industrial boilers; smelting and roasting processes used in the production 
of non-ferrous metals (lead, zinc, copper and industrial gold); waste incineration 
facilities; and cement clinker production facilities. 
The Convention sets out control measures for new sources, defined as those 
facilities constructed or substantially modified at least one year after the date of 
entry into force of the Convention for the Party concerned.39 For new sources, each 
Party must require the use of best available techniques and best environmental 
practices to control and, where feasible, reduce emissions as soon as practicable but 
no later than five years after the date of entry into force of the Convention for that 
Party.40
For existing sources, each Party is required to implement one or more of five 
listed measures.41 Those measures are: a quantified control or reduction goal; emi-
ssion limit values; use of best available techniques and best environmental prac-
tices; a multi-pollutant control strategy; and alternative measures to reduce emi-
ssions from relevant sources. Each Party must take measures as soon as practicable 
36     Minamata Convention, Article 7.3(b).
37     Minamata Convention, Article 7.2.
38     Minamata Convention, Annex D.
39     Minamata Convention, Article 8.2(c).
40     Minamata Convention, Article 8.4.
41     Minamata Convention, Article 8.5.
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but no more than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention for it.
H. Mandating Control Measures for Mercury Releases to Land or Water
The Convention requires Parties to take measures to control releases of mercu-
ry to land or water from relevant point sources not covered by other provisions of 
the Convention.42 Such measures must include one or more of four listed options: 
release limit values; use of best available techniques and best environmental 
practices; a multi-pollutant control strategy; and alternative measures to reduce 
emissions from relevant sources.43
I. Ensuring Environmentally Sound Management of Mercury Wastes
The Convention requires each Party to take appropriate measures to ensure 
mercury waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner.44 Management 
efforts must take into account guidelines developed under the Basel Convention45 
and be in accord with requirements to be adopted in the future by the Conference of 
the Parties through an additional annex. Mercury wastes are only to be recovered, 
recycled or reclaimed for a use allowed to a Party under the Convention.46 For 
Parties to the Basel Convention, transboundary transports of mercury wastes 
for the purpose of environmentally sound disposal must be in conformity with 
that Convention. Where the Basel Convention does not apply to a transboudary 
transport, a Party is only to allow such transport after taking into account 
international rules, standards and guidelines.47
The Convention also addresses the environmentally sound management of 
contaminated sites. Each party must endeavor to identify and assess sites contami-
nated with mercury or mercury compounds.48 The Conference of the Parties is given 
a mandate to adopt guidance on managing contaminated sites that may include 
suggestions relating to public engagement, human health and environmental risk 
42     Minamata Convention, Article 9.4.
43     Minamata Convention, Article 9.5.
44     Minamata Convention, Article 11.
45    Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal, 22 March 1989, U.N.T.S., Vol. 1673, p. 57.
46     Minamata Convention, Article 11.3(b).
47     Minamata Convention, Article 11.3(c).
48     Minamata Convention, Article 12.1.
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assessments and risk management options.49
J. Encouraging International Cooperation in Mercury-related 
    Research and Monitoring
The Convention urges Parties to cooperate in improving research and moni-
toring on multiple fronts.50 For example, Parties are encouraged to strengthen moni-
toring of mercury levels in vulnerable populations and in biotic media, such as fish, 
marine mammals, sea turtles and birds. Research collaborations on the technical 
and economic availability of mercury-free products and processes and on best 
available techniques and practices for reducing mercury emissions and releases are 
further encouraged.
III. Mercurial Challenges
Seven implementation challenges stand out in the wake of the new Minamata 
Convention.
A. Reaching Rigorous Ratification of the Convention
The Convention requires 50 ratifications/acceptances for entry into force.51 
As of 27 March 2015 there were 128 signatories but only 10 Parties.52 Perhaps 
surprisingly, the United States became the first Party to the Convention by depo-
siting its instrument of acceptance on November 6, 2013.53 The Convention was 
accepted as an executive agreement thereby bypassing the normal requirement for 
Senate ratification.54 How quickly other countries follow suit in formally adopting 
the Convention remains to be seen.  
49     Minamata Convention, Article 12.3
50     Minamata Convention, Article 19.
51     Minamata Convention, Article 31.
52     At http://www.mercuryconvention.org, 25 March 2015.
53     U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media Note, PRN 2013/1353, United 
States Joins Minamata Convention on Mercury, 6 November 2013, at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htm, 15 March 2015.
54     Email from Wil Burns, 7 November 2013, Minamata Convention: U.S. in the Lead? (e-mail 
communication on file with the author). 
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B. Ensuring Timely Phase-outs
The phase-out dates of 2020 for mercury-added products listed in Annex 
A, Part 1 and of 2025 and 2018 for mercury use in chlor-alkali and acetaldehyde 
production respectively are not written in stone.55 Article 6 of the Convention 
allows Parties to register for initial five-year exemptions from the phase-out dates. 
Parties may thereafter request further five-year extensions through a decision of the 
Conference of the Parties.
C. Achieving Reductions in Mercury Emissions and Releases
Considerable flexibility is left to Parties in addressing emissions and releases.56 
For mercury air emissions, no overall obligations exists to reduce emissions but on-
ly to control emissions.57 For new sources, application of best available techniques 
and best environmental practices will be required,58 but guidance on best available 
techniques and best environmental practices is left to be adopted at the first meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties,59 and emission reduction is only required “when 
feasible”.60 For existing sources, each Party is required to take at least one control 
measure but there is substantial discretion allowed in implementation as a Party 
may take into account its national circumstances and “the economic and technical 
feasibility and affordability of the measures.”61 The Convention has been criticized 
for the lack of emission limit value and/or quantified emission reduction targets for 
major sources.62 
For the five point sources of mercury emissions covered by the Convention, 
55     Henrik Selin, Global Environmental Law and Treaty-Making on Hazardous Substances: The 
Minamata Convention and Mercury Abatement, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 14, 
Issue 1, 2014, p. 10.
56     Noelle E. Selin, Global Change and Mercury Cycling: Challenges for Implementing a Glo-
bal Mercury Treaty, Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, Vol. 33, Issue 6, 2014, p. 
1202.
57    Aleksandra Tomczak, Minamata Convention on Mercury – What Does It Mean for Coal?, 
Cornerstone Magazine, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2013, pp. 27~28. 
58      Minamata Convention, Article 8.4.
59      Minamata Convention, Article 8.8(a).
60      Minamata Convention, Article 8.4.
61      Minamata Convention, Article 8.5.
62　 Lesley Sloss, The Minamata Convention – What It May Mean for Coal, at http://ww
w.iea-coal.org.uk/site/2010/publications-section/newsletter-information/current-newsletter2
/the-minamata-convention?, 15 March 2015. 
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not all such sources will necessarily to subject to control. Thresholds of determining 
which point source facilities are subject to controls have yet to be determined with 
the Conference of the Parties when required to provide guidance on threshold 
criteria “as soon as practicable.”63 Parties may establish their own criteria, for 
example, megawatt capacity of a coal-fired plant or tonnage of waste incinerated 
per hour or day by waste incineration facilities, to identify covered sources so long 
as those criteria for any category includes at least 75 per cent of the emissions from 
that category.64 
Further flexibilities also stand out in relation to mercury air emissions. Each 
Party is given up to five years after entry into force of the Convention for it to 
impose controls on new sources and 10 years for existing sources. Preparation of 
a national plan setting out control measures and expected targets and outcomes is 
optional.65 
A further air emission control limitation is the exclusion of some point sources 
sectors from control requirements. Oil, gas and iron and steel facilities are not 
covered by the Convention.66  
Regarding land and water releases of mercury, each Party is required to iden-
tify relevant point source categories of mercury releases within three years after 
entry into force of the Convention for it.67 However, only measures to control relea-
ses are required not reduction.68 Parties may choose one or more of four suggested 
measures: setting release limit values; requiring the use of best available techniques 
and best environmental practices; adoption of a multi-pollutant control strategy; 
and imposition of alternative measures.69 Preparation of a national plan setting out 
control measures and expected targets and outcomes is optional.70 
63     Minamata Convention, Article 8.9.
64     Minamata Convention, Article 8.2(b).
65     Minamata Convention, Article 8.3.
66　 IISD Reporting Services, Summary of the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Minamata Convention on Mercury and Its Preparatory Meeting: 7-11 October 2013, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 27, 2013, p. 23.
67     Minamata Convention, Article 9.3.
68     Minamata Convention, Article 9.4.
69     Minamata Convention, Article 9.5.
70     Minamata Convention, Article 9.4.
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D. Protecting Human Health
The Minamata Convention may be viewed as progressive in specifically addre-
ssing health aspects of mercury exposures,71 but the Convention has been criticized 
for its lack of legally-binding requirements on that front.72 Article 16 of the Con-
vention merely encourages various efforts to deal with health issues. For example, 
Parties are encouraged to promote: the development and implementation of strate-
gies and programmes to identify and protect populations at risk, particularly vulne-
rable populations; science-based educational and preventative programmes on mer-
cury occupational exposures; and health care services for affected populations.
E. Ensuring Adequate Financing
The Convention does offer hope in supporting developing countries and eco-
nomies in transition in implementing mercury control commitments through a two-
pronged financial mechanism.73 The Convention mandates the creation of a Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund and a specific international programme to 
support capacity-building and technical assistance.74
How effective financing will be remains to be seen. Funding is to be on a vol-
untary basis.75 Enhancement of multilateral, regional and bilateral assistance to 
developing country Parties is encouraged76 and each Party undertakes to provide, 
within its capabilities, resources to support national implementation of the Conven-
tion.77 The Conference of the Parties is required to work out the financial details 
71    Rebecca Kessler, The Minamata Convention on Mercury: A First Step toward Protecting 
Future Generations, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 121, No. 10, 2013, pp. A304, 
A308.
72     UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press Release, 
Minamata Convention on Mercury: UN Experts Call for a Full Global Response to a Global 
Scourge, 11 October 2013, at http://ieenvironment.org/2013/10/11/minamata-convention-
on-mercury-un-experts-call-for-a-full-global-response-to-a-global-scourge/, 15 March 2015.
73     Henrik Hallgrim Eriksen and Franz Xaver Perrez, The Minamata Convention: A Compre-
hensive Response to a Global Problem, Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 207~208.
74      Minamata Convention, Article 13.6.
75     Henrik Selin, Global Environmental Law and Treaty-Making on Hazardous Substances: The 
Minamata Convention and Mercury Abatement, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 14, 
Issue 1, 2014, p. 15.
76      Minamata Convention, Article 13.3.
77      Minamata Convention, Article 13.1.
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of the mechanism including the provision of guidance of the GEF Trust Fund on 
priorities and eligibilities for funding78 and deciding on the hosting institution for 
the specific funding programme including its duration.79
A resolution on financial arrangements, adopted by the Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the Minamata Convention in October 2013, has tasked the Intergo-
vernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) with further developing financial de-
tails before the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties.80 The INC is encou-
raged to: develop a draft memorandum of understanding between the GEF and 
Conference of the Parties; issue guidance on priorities and eligibilities for GEF 
Trust Fund support; and develop a proposal for the hosting institution of the 
specific international assistance programme. At the sixth session of the INC, held 
in Bangkok, 3-7 November 2014, countries agreed to establish an ad hoc working 
group of experts on financing to further address financial options.81
F. Ensuring Implementation and Compliance
The Convention might be described as being “luke warm” on implementation 
responsibilities. Each Party is left discretion as to whether a national implemen-
tation plan will be developed and executed and whether such a plan will be 
transmitted to the Secretariat.82 Each Party is required to report to the Conference 
of the Parties on implementation measures and challenges with the Conference of 
the Parties at its first meeting to decide upon the timing and format for reporting.83 
An Implementation and Compliance Committee is to be established pursuant 
to Article 15 of the Convention but the Committee will have limited review po-
wers.84 The Committee is to be facilitative in nature and may review compliance 
78      Minamata Convention, Article 13.7.
79     Minamata Convention, Article 13.9.
80     Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, Final Act of the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, UNEP(DTIE)/
Hg/CONF/4, 11 October 2013,  pp. 7~8.
81    See UNEP, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Prepare a Global 
Legally Binding Instrument on Mercury on the Work of Its Sixth Session, UNEP(DTIE)/
Hg/INC.6/24, 25 February 2015, pp. 13~14.
82     Minamata Convention, Article 20.
83     Minamata Convention, Article 21.
84      See Jessica Templeton and Pia Kohler, Implementation and Compliance under the Minama-
ta Convention on Mercury, Review of European Community & International Environmental 
Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, p. 211.
The 2013 Minamata Convention and Protection of the Arctic Environment: 
Mercurial Promises and Challenges 239
through three avenues. Review may be undertaken on the basis of: written submi-
ssions from any Party as to its own compliance; national reports; and requests from 
the Conference of the Parties. Recommendations of the Committee are to be by 
consensus but if consensus cannot be reached recommendations are to be adopted 
as a last resort by the three-fourths majority vote.85
G. Sorting out Relationships with Other Conventions and 
     International Bodies and Initiatives
With the Minamata Convention being the “new kid on the block” in interna-
tional toxic substance management,86 a host of cooperation challenges loom on the 
horizon. As recognized in a resolution on matters pertaining to other international 
bodies, adopted at the October 2013 Conference to conclude the Minamata Con-
vention, close cooperation is required particularly relating to health aspects with 
the World Health Organization, International Labour Organization and the World 
Customs Organization.87 A resolution on arrangements in the interim period, 
before entry into force of the Convention, also adopted in October 2013, requests 
the Executive Director of UNEP to prepare a report on options for a permanent 
secretariat including potential locations and the possible merging of the secretariat 
with the joint secretariat of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, the Rotterdam Convention 
on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade and the Stockholm Convention on Persistant 
Organic Pollutants.88 The Minamata Convention itself requires the Executive 
Director of UNEP to perform the secretariat functions unless the Conference of 
the Parties decides to entrust the secretariat functions to one or more international 
bodies.89 How capacity-building for mercury management might be best piggy-
85     Minamata Convention, Article 15.6.
86   David L. VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Approach and the International Control of 
Toxic Chemicals: Beacon of Hope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution, Houston Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2011, p. 605.
87     Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, Final Act of the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, UNEP(DTIE)/
Hg/CONF/4, 11 October 2013, Annex I, p. 8.
88     Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, Final Act of the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, UNEP(DTIE)/
Hg/CONF/4, 11 October 2013, Annex I, p. 6. 
89     Minamata Convention, Article 24.3.
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backed on existing or proposed training programs under other conventions is a 
further issue. The Convention’s relationship to UNEP’s voluntary Global Mercury 
Partnership90 and various regional and bilateral agreements/initiatives addressing 
mercury also need to be considered.91
The relationship of the Minamata Convention with the Protocol on Heavy 
Metals to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution92 is 
a key question. Pursuant to the Protocol, Parties have already adopted a guidance 
document on best available techniques for controlling emission of heavy metals 
including mercury93 which could be adapted as a model under the Minamata 
Convention. Parties to the Heavy Metals Protocol have already established a limit 
value for mercury emissions for waste incineration (0.05 mg/m3).94 Pursuant to the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries resolution on arrangements in the interim period, 
an Expert Group on Best Available Techniques and Best Environmental Practices 
has been established to draft a guidance document but it remains to be seen how far 
elements from the Heavy Metals Protocol will be considered.95
The interrelationships between the financial mechanism under the Minamata 
Convention and other international financing schemes relevant to mercury also 
need to be sorted out.96 At the first session of the United Nations Environment 
90    For reviews of the Partnership’s various activities relating to mercury, see UNEP, Mercury 
Acting Now!, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP Chemicals Branch, 2013; and UNEP, Report on 
Activities Undertaken within the UNEP Global Mercury Partnership (July 2013-July 2014), 
UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/PAG.6/4, 16 October 2014.
91     Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Assessment of Existing and Planned Initia-
tives Addressing Mercury Sources in the Arctic States and Identification of Possible Mea-
sures for Follow-up, Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Environmental Protection Agency, 
2006.
92    Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy 
Metals, 24 June 1998, U.N.T.S., Vol. 2237, p. 4.  
93     Economic Commission for Europe, Guidance Document on Best Available Techniques for 
Controlling Emissions of Heavy Metals and Their Compounds from Source Categories 
Listed in Annex II to the Protocol on Heavy Metals, UNECE, 2013, ECE/EB.AIR/116. 
94    Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy 
Metals, 24 June 1998, U.N.T.S., Vol. 2237, p. 4, Annex V. 
95　  See UNEP, Development of Guidance Documents, UNEP (DTIE)/Hg/EG.1/5; UNEP, 
Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Prepare a Global Legally 
Binding Instrument on Mercury on the Work of Its Sixth Session, UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/
INC.6/24, 25 February 2015, pp. 11~12.
96     It was raised by the representative speaking on behalf of Latin American and Caribbean 
States at the sixth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. See UNEP, 
Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Prepare a Global Legally 
Binding Instrument on Mercury on the Work of Its Sixth Session, UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/
INC.6/24, 25 February 2015, pp. 5~6.
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Assembly of UNEP in June 2014, representatives agreed to establish a new special 
programme to support institutional strengthening at the national level to enhance 
implementation of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, the Minamata 
Convention on Mercury and the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals 
Management.97 How this new special programme will relate to the Minamata 
Convention’s specific international programme to support capacity-building and 
technical assistance98 has yet to be resolved.
IV. Conclusion
The Minamata Convention certainly represents a step forward for the protec-
tion of the Arctic environment. With long-range transport of mercury into the region 
a long time problem, the Convention offers a suite of promises to control and curb 
mercury emissions and releases. Phase-out dates have been set for a long list of 
mercury-added products including batteries, many fluorescent lamps, switches and 
relays, pesticides, and various measuring devices including thermometers. Primary 
mercury mining is on the road to termination. Use of mercury-free products and 
industrial processes seems bound to increase. 
Member States of the Arctic Council themselves recognized the major mile-
stone reached through the adoption of the Convention. In a formal statement to 
the Diplomatic Conference on the Minamata Convention in October 2013, Canada 
on behalf of the Arctic Council welcomed the adoption of the Convention and the 
progress in laying the groundwork for global reductions of mercury emissions.99
However, the Minamata Convention stands out as a text laden with political 
compromises and largely displaying lowest common denominator standards. With 
no concrete emission reduction targets and emission limits being set, the door may 
be open for countries to actually increase their emission capacities.100 No phase-out 
97      United Nations Environmental Assembly of the United Nations Environmental Program-
me, Proceedings of the United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations En-
vironment Programme at Its First Session, UNEP/EA.1/10, pp. 30~36.   
98        Minamata Convention, Article 13.6(b).
99         Statement to the Diplomatic Conference on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, at ht-
tp://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/407-statements?dow
nload=1898:minamata-convention-on-mercury-october-2013, 15 March 2015.
100    Rebecca Kessler, The Minamata Convention on Mercury: A First Step toward Protecting 
Future Generations, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 121, No. 10, 2013, pp. 
A304, A307. 
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date has been set for the greatest source of mercury in the environment, artisanal 
and small-scale gold mining and the use of mercury in dental amalgam is not 
eliminated but only to be gradually reduced.101 The Convention may also allow 
substantial “foot dragging” as Parties may request exemptions from established 
phase-out dates and Parties are given 5 year and 10 year leeways to bring new and 
existing point sources of mercury air emissions under control.102
Some of the most difficult political and technical issues in mercury manage-
ment have been deferred to the treaty implementation stage. Thresholds for deter-
mining what point source facilities are subject to emission control and reduction 
commitments have yet to be agreed to. Guidance on best available techniques 
and best environmental practices has yet to be forged. Sorting out the institutional 
arrangements with other conventions and international bodies and initiatives 
relating to mercury remains a work in progress. Financial arrangements and 
contributions, the “heart and soul” of ensuring strong treaty implementation, have 
yet to be finalized.
Nevertheless, substantial drafting and financial progressions may be seen in 
the interim period before the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention 
called for further meetings of the INC in order to prepare for the Convention’s 
entry into force.103 Various guidance documents and forms, including those relating 
to written consent and reporting, are being prepared under the direction of the 
INC which held its sixth session in November 2014.104 The GEF has agreed to 
include mercury and the Minamata Convention within its new integrated focal 
area on chemicals and wastes and the GEF has allocated $141 million from its 
6th replenishment period to support entry into force of the Convention and its 
101    Rebecca Kessler, The Minamata Convention on Mercury: A First Step toward Protecting 
Future Generations, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 121, No. 10, 2013, p. A307.  
102    Rebecca Kessler, The Minamata Convention on Mercury: A First Step toward Protecting 
Future Generations, Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 121, No. 10, 2013, p. A307.
103      Through Resolution 1 on arrangements in the interim period. See Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, Final Act of the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/CONF/4, 
Annex I, p. 5.
104    See UNEP, Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Prepare a Global 
Legally Binding Instrument on Mercury on the Work of Its Sixth Session, UNEP(DTIE)/
Hg/INC.6/24, 25 February 2014.
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implementation.105
Future evolutions in the overall framework for international chemicals and 
waste management remain uncertain.106 The need for a more comprehensive chemi-
cals convention has been raised by various authors,107 but political support has not 
been forthcoming to move towards a more integrated and precautionary approach. 
The Minamata Convention in fact represents a continuation of the traditional 
“problem by problem” approach.108 Whether lead, cadmium, and other heavy 
metals will eventually require global legally binding commitments is a further 
question.109
While the Minamata Convention sets promising directions for addressing 
long-range transport of mercury into the Arctic, implementation efforts are likely to 
be long and arduous. The Convention is not an end point but a starting point. 
105     See UNEP, Report on Activities of the Global Environment Facility in Relation to the 
Minamata Convention during the Interim Period, UNEP (DTIE)/Hg/INC.6/INF/6, 14 
October 2014.
106　 On the need for future regulatory debates and imaginations, see Elizabeth Fisher, Chemi-
cals as Regulatory Objects, Review of European Community & International Environ-
mental Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, p. 163.
107　 See, e.g., Katharina Kummer Peiry, The Chemicals and Waste Regime as a Basis for a 
Comprehensive International Framework on Sustainable Management of Potentially 
Hazardous Materials?, Review of European Community & International Environmental 
Law, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2014, p. 172; Ken Geiser and Sally Edwards, Instruments and 
Approaches for the Sound Management of Chemicals, in UNEP ed,, Global Chemicals 
Outlook – towards Sound Management of Chemicals, UNEP, 2013, pp. 173~236, 230.
108　  Katharina Kummer Peiry, The Chemicals and Waste Regime as a Basis for a Compre-
hensive International Framework on Sustainable Management of Potentially Hazardous 
Materials?, Review of Economic Community & International Environmental Law, Vol. 23, 
Issue 2, 2014, p. 176.
109     Resolution 1/5 on Chemicals and Wastes, adopted at the first session of the United Nations 
Environment Assembly in June 2014, recognized the continuing significant risk of lead 
and cadmium releases to human health and the environment but was thin on prescriptions, 
suggesting possible regional workshops on lead paint and further compilations of 
information on emission abatement and management techniques for lead and cadmium. 
UNEP, Proceedings of the United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations 
Environment Programme at Its First Session, UNEP/EA.1/10, 2 September 2014, p. 32.
